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ARTICLE
Party politics and intelligence: the Labour Party, British 
intelligence and oversight, 1979-1994
Daniel W. B. Lomas
ABSTRACT
For much of the 20th Century, intelligence and security was a taboo 
subject for Parliamentarians. While Labour backbenchers had suspicions 
of the secret state, there was a long-held bipartisan consensus that 
debates on intelligence were ‘dangerous and bad’. Yet by the 1970s, 
new disclosures on the activities of foreign intelligence and domestic 
surveillance eroded this consensus with the Labour Party willing to push 
for greater accountability and oversight of the UK’s intelligence agencies. 
This article looks at how, through the campaign to reform intelligence 
oversight, Labour pushed for changes reflected in later legislation. It also 
explores Labour’s attitudes to intelligence.
The emergence of Soviet Bloc era files in 2018 suggesting that then Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
was targeted by Czechoslovak State Security (the Státní bezpečnost StB) as a backbench MP in the 
1980s brought intelligence and security issues to the forefront of the UK national press and politics. 
The documents, found in the Czech Republic, showed that StB officers thought Corbyn ‘reserved and 
courteous’, occasionally ‘explosive’ on human rights, but often ‘calm and collected’. Corbyn was also 
‘negative towards the USA’ and took a ‘positive’ view of the Eastern Bloc, they reported, with the StB 
keen to maintain contact, ascribing Corbyn the codename COB. A spokesperson for the Labour Party 
said Corbyn was unaware the individual was an StB officer, while Corbyn himself dismissed the 
claims as ‘ridiculous smears’. Conservative Party MPs and MEPs, unsurprisingly, described the Labour 
leader an ‘embittered fool’ arguing that the claims, if true, would ‘disqualify Corbyn from holding any 
elected office’, with the story taking on an increasingly party political dimension.1 In the previous 
century, parliament and Hon. Members had largely tried to stay away from intelligence matters, 
taking the view that these subjects should stay off the political agenda. Nonetheless, the activities of 
Britain’s intelligence and security agencies had become increasingly politicised from the 1960s 
onwards, fuelled by the gradual end of the ‘consensus’ politics,2 a wave of spy scandals, pressure 
for parliamentary oversight, and Labour’s own long-held suspicions of the ‘secret state’. By the 1980s, 
Labour’s willingness to raise intelligence even led to the first attempt by a British political party to set 
out a legal framework for Britain’s agencies – the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS or MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the end of the Official Secrets 
Act and Parliamentary accountability, with some of the recommendations echoing the later Security 
Service Act (1989) and Intelligence Services Act (1994), eventually bringing Britain’s agencies in from 
the cold. While overlooked by those discussing UK intelligence oversight, Labour’s policy proposals – 
the first to appear in a party manifesto, signalled the real emergence of intelligence and security as 
a party-political issue and the final end to the bipartisan reluctance to make such matters a routine 
part of political discourse. Using the papers of the Labour Party’s ‘Security Services Study Group’, this 
article looks at Labour’s efforts to reform Britain’s intelligence oversight, placing it in the wider 
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context of British party politics, the history of the Labour Party, and discussions on intelligence 
oversight more generally. As such, the article also explores how Labour’s thinking on intelligence and 
security, largely shaped by long-held fears that the UK’s agencies were unaccountable, gave much 
impetus to wider pressures for change, effectively pushing for reforms now taken for granted in the 
liberal democratic oversight of intelligence.
Parliament, party politics and intelligence in Britan
Intelligence and security was a taboo subject for Britain’s parliamentarians, even if many former 
intelligence officers sat in both the House of Lords and the Commons.3 For much of the Twentieth 
Century few Hon. Members were willing to break Foreign Secretary Sir Austin Chamberlain’s 1924 
dictum, ‘It is of the essence of a Secret Service that it must be secret, and if you once begin disclosure 
it is perfectly obvious to me as to hon. Members opposite that there is no longer any Secret Service 
and that you must do without it’.4 The intelligence community was ‘the “invisible” man of govern-
ment’, writes Christopher Moran, ‘a state within a state about which questions were never asked’.5 In 
parliament there was a ‘bipartisan consensus to protect the intelligence community from any . . . 
discussion’, even if, following security scandals and intelligence leaks, the issue raised its head often 
via backbenchers and the ‘awkward squad’.6 One backbench Conservative MP even recalled it was 
‘almost unpatriotic’ to raise questions on intelligence, adding it was simply ‘not done’.7 Even so, 
there were occasions when intelligence was cited to support government policy – sometimes with 
disastrous consequences,8 yet Prime Ministers were generally loath to discuss the matter, beyond 
carefully worded statements. In July 1963, following former SIS officer ‘Kim’ Philby’s defection to the 
Soviet Union, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told MPs, ‘It is dangerous and bad for our general 
national interest to discuss these matters. It has been a very long tradition of the House to trust the 
relations between the two parties to discussions between the Leader of the Opposition of the day 
and the Prime Minister of the day. I ask the House now to revert to the older tradition which I think is 
in our real interests’ – a view echoed by Leader of the Opposition Harold Wilson (‘we feel that in the 
public interest this is a matter which should now be left where it is and not made the subject of 
further public discussion or public inquiry’).9 Wilson famously wrote in his book, The Governance of 
Britain, ‘The prime minister is occasionally questioned on matters arising out of his responsibility. His 
answers may be regarded as uniformly uninformative’.10 Wilson’s chapter certainly reflected the 
absence of public information on security and intelligence in the public domain, while also betraying 
that all was not well in his relationship with internal security. Privately, Wilson believed that while 
‘Secret Service must be secret’, it needed to be ‘of service, i.e. it must be efficient’ and ‘responsive to 
democratic, i.e. Ministerial, control’.11 Questioned by Labour MPs on the publication of MI5 officer 
Peter Wright’s memoir, Spycatcher, Margaret Thatcher maintained the same principle, ‘I shall follow 
the precedent set by previous Prime Ministers and, I understand, upheld in “Erskine May”, of not 
commenting on security matters’.12 For successive governments it was as if, historian Sir Michael 
Howard explained, the ‘British security and intelligence services, MI5 and MI6, do not exist. Enemy 
agents are found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought by the storks’.13
Yet while successive Prime Minister’s fought to uphold this bipartisan, if increasingly nonsensical, 
line that intelligence did ‘not exist’, traditional members of the ‘awkward squad’, backbenchers, even 
Leaders of the Opposition, occasionally raised intelligence and security for ‘party political 
purposes’.14 As one study of parliamentary attitudes to intelligence observe, ‘It is almost certainly 
the case that some parliamentarians have sought to make mischief, and have revelled in the obvious 
discomfort of ministers who have attempted to respond to questions which obviously relate to 
intelligence while avoiding mention of the existence of the intelligence and security agencies’.15 
After the disappearance of diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951, Foreign Office 
minister Kenneth Younger complained of Conservative parliamentary questions: ‘The Tories, know-
ing that Guy at least has expressed leftwing [sic] views in the past . . . trying to make political capital 
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out of it [and] some are calling for a witch hunt’.16 Similarly, the disappearance of decorated war hero 
and frogman Commander Lionel ‘Buster’ Crabb during a botched SIS operation in Portsmouth, led 
the press and Opposition MPs to attack the competence of the secret services, Labour’s Hugh 
Gaitskell calling them ‘incompetent and inept’.17 The Crabb debate was ‘unprecedented’ in parlia-
mentary history, writes Moran.18 For Conservative MP Sir Patrick Spens it was ‘contrary to all our 
precedents’ and against the ‘public interest’, with fellow Conservative backbencher and SOE veteran 
Sir James Hutchison complaining of the secret services having to ‘do a striptease act and cast aside 
one veil after another’.19 The sustained political fallout from the Burgess-Maclean defection, the 
ongoing speculation about the identity of Cambridge spy ring’s ‘Third Man’, the arrest and senten-
cing of SIS officer George Blake for spying for the Soviet Union, and news that Minister of War John 
Profumo had shared a lover with GRU officer Evgeni Ivanov, kept intelligence and security in the 
headlines. Labour MP’s George Wigg and Richard Crossman took great delight in embarrassing the 
Conservatives. ‘The Services and security are a subject on which the Tories feel they must be able to 
do far better than us. So the appalling disclosure of incompetence and laxity has had its effect’, 
Crossman wrote in June 1963. ‘Personally George Wigg and I did feel fairly proud that for ten years 
now, since the Burgess and MacLean [sic] episode, we have been preaching the lessons of security 
and exposing the effects of the British ruling class of this deep inner laxity’.20 In July 1963, during 
a stormy debate, Macmillan attacked Wilson’s questioning as ‘complicated and offensive’.21 In the 
ensuing Profumo Affair, also Wilson criticised the Conservatives and MI5 who were, he told the 
House of Commons, acting with ‘nonchalant amateurism in a world of ruthless professionalism’, 
turning essentially a kiss and tell into a full blown security scandal.22
Knowing that Wilson and the Labour front bench had exploited security, Conservative MPs 
similarly taunted Labour, using leaks and reports from journalist Harry Chapman Pincher and 
others.23 George Blake’s dramatic escape from prison in October 1966 added to the pressure; the 
Conservatives tabled a motion that ‘This House deplores the refusal of the Secretary of State to set up 
a specific inquiry to report as a matter of urgency on the escape of George Blake’.24 The 1980s also 
witnessed a new and long-lasting breakdown in the prohibitions around security and intelligence. As 
a March 1983 House of Commons briefing paper observed, ‘It is probably true to say that the interest 
in security matters, inside and outside Parliament, in the last few years, has not been matched since 
the early 1960s’.25 During her tenure, Thatcher was repeatedly ‘forced to breach the traditional 
taboos’ on intelligence and parliament, thanks to another round of successive spy scandals that kept 
security and intelligence matters at the ‘forefront of public affairs’.26 While often seen by some as an 
age of secrecy, the 1980s was also marred by whistle-blowers, Whitehall leaks, and former intelli-
gence officers willing to tell their stories, resulting in new controversies for the government to 
handle. For Labour MPs, Thatcher’s enforced silence became an important political stick used to 
attack government policy, knowing that Downing Street could never respond.
The Labour Party was particularly vocal on such sensitive matters, fuelled by generations of 
suspicion of the ‘secret state’. During the First World War, future Prime Minister James Ramsay 
MacDonald had openly questioned the use of the ‘Secret Vote’ to fund intelligence activities, while 
MI5’s first Director-General Sir Vernon Kell accepted there was a widespread belief on the left that the 
police and security services were used to ‘spy upon Labour in this country’ – a view shared by 
successive generations of party supporters. During Labour’s first government, MacDonald ques-
tioned the value of Special Branch reports, while intelligence officials harboured their own suspi-
cions. The collapse of MacDonald’s government amid the now-infamous ‘Zinoviev Letter Affair’, the 
leak of letter reputedly from chair of the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev, by intelligence officials to The 
Daily Mail amid a frenzied General Election in October 1924, only reinforced the belief that the ‘secret 
state’ and wider establishment was hostile. With hindsight, although there was certainly a small 
number of intelligence officials, fearful of a Labour government, with the necessary motive and 
opportunity to leak, talk of a wider establishment plot – as a later study by the FCO Chief Historian 
Gill Bennett established – seems ‘inherently unlikely’.27 In the short term, the perception of wider 
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plot hurt Labour’s attitudes to intelligence. In August 1925, Labour’s Advisory Committee on 
International Questions, other than push for reforms to the Foreign Office itself, pushed for the 
‘suspension . . . of all secret service activities’, even if MacDonald and his Ministers benefitted from 
intelligence in Labour’s second government from June 1929.28 If anything, the impact of the Zinoviev 
episode – at least on frontbench and government attitudes to intelligence – may be overstated; the 
Attlee government had a close relationship with intelligence officials, although it can be argued that 
the ghost of Zinoviev cast long shadow over the Labour left, forever haunting the left’s perceptions 
of intelligence.29
Labour’s defeat in 1951 saw the party out of office until its return under Harold Wilson, with 
a new generation of MPs unfamiliar with the ‘secret state’ and prone to conspiracy entering 
government. Wilson’s Lord Chancellor, Gerald Gardiner, wrongly believed MI5 was even bugging 
his phone, preferring to deal with confidential matters in his Ministerial vehicle,30 naively asking his 
colleague, Home Secretary Frank Soskice, for access to his own MI5 file – a request promptly 
dismissed.31 Barbara Castle, another member of Wilson’s ministerial team, questioned MI5’s 
reports. ‘The material is always mighty thin and most of it would be obvious anyway to an 
informed politician . . . Altogether, I really wonder what we pay these people for’, Castle wrote.32 
Yet despite the reservations of colleagues and backbenchers, Wilson initially maintained a good 
working relationship with Britain’s intelligence community, especially MI5.33 But responding to 
concerns about MI5’s powers, Wilson had also tried to limit MI5’s investigations into MPs under the 
so-called ‘Wilson Doctrine’34 – a decision that halted the service’s own investigations into several 
Labour backbenchers.35 Wilson’s second term was also overshadowed by claims of an MI5 plot, 
secretive right-wing groups, and spurious allegations that South Africa’s Bureau of State Security 
(or BOSS) was working against both Wilson and Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe.36 Wilson’s sudden 
resignation in 1976, followed shortly afterwards by claims MI5 had gone rogue, revived Labour’s 
traditional fears of the ‘secret state’. For many outside Wilson’s Cabinet, with little experience of 
intelligence, the security services posed a threat to British democracy and needed long-term 
reform. In this climate, intelligence and security would become a party-political issue eroding 
the bipartisan taboo on the subject.
The NEC security services study group
Labour’s drive for oversight of Britain’s intelligence community took place against the backdrop of 
the Watergate scandal and ‘year of intelligence’ that shed the spotlight on the US intelligence 
community’s alleged dirty tricks at home and around the world. Investigations by the US Senate 
Select Committee to ‘Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities’, chaired 
by Senator Frank Church, and House of Representatives counterpart, the Pike Committee, revealed 
sensational claims about domestic surveillance, the assassination of foreign leaders and other 
excesses, rocking Washington and ushering in a new period of agency oversight.37 In Britain, both 
press commentators and those on the Labour left often viewed the activities of Britain’s intelligence 
and security agencies through the prism of American abuses. Stories of MI5’s surveillance of the left 
and claims that the Security Service had worked against Wilson’s government did little to dampen 
concerns. Sensationally such claims came from Wilson himself who, following his resignation as 
Prime Minister in April 1976, approached BBC journalists Barrie Penrose and Roger Courtiour (or 
‘Pencourt’) with the claim that right-wing elements of MI5, supported by the CIA and South African 
spies, had started a smear campaign against Labour. ‘I am not certain that for the last eighteen 
months when I was Prime Minister’, Wilson said, ‘I knew what was happening, fully, in security’. Parts 
of MI5 were ‘very right-wing’ and believed, he told the journalists, that ‘Socialist leaders were another 
form of Communist’, including, Director General Sir Michael Hanley had reportedly told Wilson, 
a ‘disaffected faction with extreme right-wing views’.38 The allegations, sensationalised in The 
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Observer in 1977, and published as The Pencourt File a year later, although dismissed by Wilson as 
‘cock and bull’,39 did little to dampen suspicion on Labour’s backbenches that MI5 had gone rogue.
While Wilson restricted MI5’s surveillance of MPs, there was also a widespread belief that Labour 
members were monitored. The journalist Chapman Pincher had claimed that fifteen Labour MPs had 
been subject to ‘tapping, shadowing, opening of mail, examination of bank accounts and other 
methods’ having been brought to MI5’s attention by the Labour leadership as crypto-communists. 
The report was inaccurate; MI5’s Graham Mitchell rebuffed the approach as it was ‘incumbent on the 
Security Service to be very careful to do nothing which could be represented as partaking of a party 
political nature’.40 But the omission of MI5’s lack of interest, and suggestion that MPs were bugged, 
only played into suspicions that the service was far from impartial, tapping into deepening worries 
about MI5’s growing focus on counter-subversion.41 Claims had already started to appear, mainly in 
the left-wing press, alleging that MI5 indulged in the wholesale surveillance and bugging of 
organisations and members of pressure groups including the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), while growing alarm at new surveillance technologies, the growth in telecommunications and 
computers, and the storage and sharing of information, also stoked Labour’s paranoia leading to 
calls for greater accountability.42
Yet while Britain certainly lagged well behind debates on accountability in the US, Canada and 
Australia, allegations that Britain’s agencies were ‘rogue’ and unaccountable were not entirely 
accurate. While modern-day parliamentary oversight and agency avowal was far in the future, 
Britain’s intelligence and security agencies had been subject to internal Whitehall control. Since 
1951, following Sir Norman Brook’s report on Britain’s agencies, the Permanent Secretaries’ 
Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS), made up of the heads of the Foreign Office, Home 
Office, and Ministry of Defence, under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, had scrutinised the 
funds allocated between the intelligence and security agencies, while Treasury officials closely 
watched intelligence finances.43 The Cabinet Secretary also took a keen interest in the financing of 
intelligence, as Sir John Hunt, then Cabinet Secretary, told Wilson: ‘Like my predecessor I provide the 
channel of advice to you on intelligence and act as Accounting Officer for the Secret Vote’.44 
Ministers were also answerable to Parliament for the agencies themselves – the Foreign Secretary 
for SIS and GCHQ, Home Secretary for the Security Service. As Trend briefed incoming Prime Minister 
Edward Heath in June 1970, ‘the Security Service look to the Home Secretary as their Minister . . . but 
that the Director-General has the right of direct access to you if he judges this necessary’.45 Labour’s 
Under-Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Shirley Summerskill told MPs in July 1977, ‘The House is 
entitled to look to the Ministers to whom the security service is answerable and accountable – that is, 
my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and in the last resort my right hon. Friend the Prime 
Minister’, adding that ‘accountability must be to Ministers rather than to Parliament, and trusts 
Ministers to discharge that responsibility faithfully’.46 The Home Secretary also played a role in the 
‘hazy’ process of issuing warrants for intercepting communications, signing off MI5 and Special 
Branch requests, even if process was far from perfect.47 In his report on the intercept of commu-
nications, Lord Diplock explained the Secretary of State was reliant on the reports of the Security 
Service to justify interception, acknowledging that if the information was ‘not accurate the main 
safeguard of requiring the warrant to be issued by the Secretary of State in person, breaks down’.48
But for many, allegations of MI5 and Special Branch surveillance of the left, lack of parliamentary 
scrutiny, and a continuing veil of secrecy, served only to heighten suspicions that the intelligence 
services were hostile. Labour activist Peter Hain, a future Cabinet Minister and campaigner in the 
anti-apartheid movement, feared he was at the centre of a smear campaign by the South Africans, 
supported by MI5, complaining of ‘a tapped line’.49 Like many activists, Hain suspected that right 
wing elements of MI5 were ‘embroiled in a campaign against political opponents’ who were, he 
claimed, fearful of a Labour government committed to redistributing power, introducing Freedom of 
Information legislation and removing American nuclear bases from the UK.50
Another sceptic was Tony Benn, Secretary of State for Energy since June 1975. Benn was an ardent 
critic of the intelligence services, his diaries littered with references to bugging and allegations of 
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undercover activities by Britain’s agencies, writing there was ‘no political control whatsoever over 
the security services. They regard a Minister – even the Home Secretary – as a transitory person’.51 By 
1975, in an audio diary entry when he was Industry Secretary, Benn recalled how his son, Joshua, was 
able to hear a phone call on his radio, convincing him there was a transmitter in the room:
As I was sitting listening myself, Carol52 came down and beckoned me away and so I went upstairs and 
discovered that Joshua was picking up my telephone call to Frances on his radio. So obviously there is 
a transmitter bug in my room – whether put here by the CIA, by MI5 or by the Post Office or KGB I do not 
know – but it was absolute confirmation because Joshua picked it up on his portable radio that wasn’t plugged 
in at all to the electrical system . . . It is a very interesting confirmation of what I have long suspected – that my 
phone is tapped.53
Later, speaking to trade unionist Clive Jenkins, Benn discussed bugging in May 1977. ‘Clive told me 
his phone was bugged because on a couple of occasions a voice had broken in and said, “Look out 
Clive, look out’.54 Whatever the truth to the claims, such stories only stoked Benn’s obsession that 
Britain’s agencies had gone rogue. During a meeting of the NEC in July, he told colleagues ‘there was 
a massive problem’ of intelligence agencies subverting democratic freedoms, and in 
September 1978, Benn had even asked Home Secretary Merlyn Rees whether his telephone had 
been tapped.55 Concerns about phone tapping also fed into wider fears of CIA involvement in British 
politics, a subject that had come to the fore in the heated debates around CIA whistle-blower Philip 
Agee’s deportation to the US in 1977.56 In time, Benn would also press the NEC to investigate the 
penetration of extreme left-wing groups by the CIA, despite opposition from Labour General 
Secretary Ron Hayward and MP Shirley Williams.57
Although mistaken about bugging and the US intelligence activities in the UK, such concerns led 
Benn to press for greater intelligence accountability, submitting a paper to the NEC’s Home Policy 
Committee, ‘Civil Liberties and the Security Services’. Just weeks earlier, in September 1978, the TUC 
passed a resolution expressing ‘concern and alarm at certain activities’ of Special Branch, calling for 
an independent inquiry to its activities. In his paper, Benn argued for the formation of a ‘small study 
group’ to examine how greater accountability of the security services could be achieved, without 
undermining national security. The paper talked of the dangers of the intelligence services, given 
their secret nature, drifting ‘into practices which would actually undermine, or endanger, the free-
dom they are supposed to defend’, recognising that new technology, ‘extensive surveillance, 
computerized dossiers and secret files’ could cover a broad range of ‘people, beliefs and activities’. 
Though reflecting in many ways Benn’s paranoia of security issues, his proposals argued for a set of 
annual reports for MPs, detailing the financing, activities and even the names of agency heads, and 
the formation of a ‘special House of Commons Select Committee, meeting when necessary in secret, 
composed exclusively of Privy Counsellors’ to handle secret information and set up to ‘question both 
responsible Ministers and Security Officers’. The agencies would be placed on a statutory footing 
with the introduction of a ‘Security Service Annual Act’ which would allow Parliament to gain 
‘ultimate control’.58
Naturally, given the reluctance of successive governments to discuss intelligence and security 
matters, the proposals met resistance. On 25 October, Benn was summoned to Downing Street to 
discuss his paper with the Prime Minister James Callaghan. Before the meeting, Callaghan had been 
briefed by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, who had discussed the paper with Whitehall 
Intelligence Co-Coordinator59 Sir Anthony Duff and Sir Robert Armstrong, Permanent Under- 
Secretary to the Home Office, and Hunt’s future successor. As Prime Minister, Callaghan was less 
intrigued by intelligence than his predecessor, despite his experience in government. Interestingly, 
Callaghan had once been confused about Ministerial responsibility, asking Hunt in 1976: ‘Is the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary formally responsible for MI6 and the Home Secretary for MI5 – 
or am I?’.60 Replying to Benn’s proposals, Hunt told Callaghan the current arrangements had worked 
‘well’ and were reliant on trust between Ministers and agencies. With a lack of Parliamentary and 
public pressure for accountability, Hunt explained the ‘balance is still in favour of preserving the 
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 415
present arrangements’ and Benn’s doubts stemmed, he correctly surmised, from the fact he had 
never had a portfolio dealing with intelligence, suggesting Callaghan needed to reassure Benn of the 
safeguards already in place.61 Yet if Callaghan tried to smother Benn’s fears, he failed. The meeting 
highlighted the already spiky relationship between the two62 and, rather than convince Benn 
otherwise, it only reinforced his suspicions, as Benn’s diary reveals. For Benn, Callaghan was 
dismissive, arguing that Benn was using the NEC ‘to get at the Government’. While Benn saw reform 
as necessary, Callaghan seemingly dismissed any suggestion that MI5 was monitoring telephone 
conversations. ‘We hardly bug anybody’, said Callaghan, admitting to Benn ‘your phone isn’t tapped’. 
Callaghan even went on to admit that Wilson was ‘just a Walter Mitty’, replying further oversight 
would simply ‘drive the Intelligence Service [sic] underground’.63
Callaghan’s opposition may account for the delay in the formation of Benn’s ‘study group’ as it was 
not until October 1979, five months after Labour’s General Election defeat, that the NEC ‘Security 
Services Study Group’ met for the first time.64 By now, the party had descended into acrimony over 
Labour’s past record, with divisions opening between right and left. Though Callaghan remained leader 
of an increasingly divided party until November 1980, a bad tempered party conference, the rising 
influence of the ‘Bennite’ left and Michael Foot’s election as leader, created an atmosphere in which 
oversight was put back on the agenda.65 Chaired by Jo Richardson, MP for Barking, the new ‘Security 
Services Study Group’ included several backbenchers suspicious of the intelligence services with little 
experience of the ‘secret state’, including Denis Skinner, Michael Meacher, Robin Cook, Judith Hart, 
Peter Archer and Peter Hain. Other attendees included the General Secretary of the National Council for 
Civil Liberties, Patricia Hewitt, a future Minister under Tony Blair, who, in an earlier pamphlet, Privacy: 
The Information Gatherers, argued the public were kept ‘entirely in the dark’ about Britain’s intelligence 
agencies, pushing for safeguards against invasive surveillance techniques.66 Another member was the 
Marxist historian E.P. Thompson, a founding member of the Communist Party of Great Britain’s 
Historians Group, who had resigned from the party in response to the 1956 Soviet invasion of 
Hungary, becoming a prominent member of CND, and a target of MI5 surveillance.67 Research for 
the group was carried out by journalist Duncan Campbell, who had already started to erode the wall of 
secrecy around Britain’s intelligence and security community, revealing the existence, purpose and 
location of GCHQ in 1976, culminating in the now infamous ‘ABC Trial’ where Campbell and his co- 
defendants, Crispin Aubrey and John Berry, faced prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.68 Other 
than Campbell, the committee used newspaper articles and the few published sources available, 
including investigative journalist Tony Bunyan’s The Political Police in Britain.69 The NEC also tried to 
speak to the heads of Britain’s agencies, Sir Robert Armstrong, now Cabinet Secretary, telling Thatcher 
in February 1981 that such an approach could only be ‘negative’ and likely to result in political point 
scoring.70 The committee pushed for a short consultation paper, addressing wider concerns about 
secrecy and surveillance, presented to ‘all Party affiliates and interested bodies’, with a series of 
Parliamentary questions anticipated to obtain information ‘on record’.71 By late-November, the com-
mittee agreed that speaking engagements, an education campaign, and consultation papers would 
highlight the NEC’s drive for reform, with committee members raising themes ‘including G.C.H.Q., 
Surveillance (not least in Northern Ireland), Subversion (its new definition) the politics of “National 
Security” international comparisons, the lack of historical analysis (due to the lack of access to 
information), positive vetting and data protection’.72
Members of the group also supported a proposed ten-minute rule bill from Robin Cook, MP for 
Edinburgh Central, aiming to bring MI5 onto the statute.73 A Foreign Secretary in Tony Blair’s first 
government and responsible for SIS and GCHQ, Cook had been a critic of the Wilson and Callaghan 
governments, a supporter of CND’s policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, supporting Michael 
Foot’s leadership bid for the party, who had raised the issue of Special Branch surveillance several 
times in parliament.74 Cook presented his bill in the aftermath of the announcement that Sir Anthony 
Blunt, wartime MI5 officer, art historian and Keeper of the Queen’s Pictures, had been Soviet spy, with 
the story of Blunt’s treachery only slowly unravelling and officially announced during a statement to 
the House of Commons by Thatcher in November 1979.75 For many on Labour’s backbenches, this 
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was a case of ‘the establishment’ closing ranks to protect one of their own. During the debate on 
Blunt, Cook argued for a report giving ‘us the information on general policy and general budgeting 
that we need if we are to maintain our defence policy’ while it was ‘an impossible irony and 
a logically untenable position to say that we require a Security Service to protect our democracy 
but that we cannot make that service answerable to democratic control and democratic structures’.76 
The next month, presenting his Bill, Cook reinforced the need for reform; it was ‘remarkable . . . that 
there is no Act on the statute book that provides the Government with the legal authority to raise 
and maintain a Security Service’, arguing for a new remit to restrict surveillance to ‘citizens who may 
be judged to be undermining parliamentary democracy by violent means or by any other unlawful 
means’.77 Cook’s bill was eventually voted down, Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, writing it was 
‘unnecessary’.78
But for the NEC’s security services committee, reform was needed. Blunt’s secretive deal to avoid 
prosecution highlighted ‘the system of accountability to ministers is . . . weak’79 – even if Callaghan 
had actually known about the details.80 Labour’s rationale for agency avowal, reforms to surveillance 
and secrecy laws, and intelligence oversight were set out in a consultative paper, released in 
December 1979, selling 26,000 copies across the labour movement.81 Washington’s ‘year of intelli-
gence’ also had important lessons for Britain, the paper argued, and future reform was necessary for 
any Labour government. Intelligence accountability and reform were, the document argued:
. . . matters which have to be faced by a democratic and socialist party. We aim to change society and to change 
some of its institutions. To some, therefore, we are rightly a threat. But we must distinguish between threats to 
our national boundaries and to the principle of democratic government on the one hand and threats to 
particular governmental, class or party interests on the other hand. We must take an absolutely firm stand in 
defence of the principle that the British people have the right to change society.82
The document also made Labour’s case for reform:
. . . The Watergate affair showed the world how easy and dangerous it can be for government security and 
intelligence services which are charged with the defence of the State from external attack to become involved in 
the defence of the State from internal threats defined by those services themselves. It showed how easily this 
can in turn lead the intelligence and security services to try and to defend not only the institutions of the State 
but also the economic, industrial and political interests of particular classes or groups – or even of individuals.83
The foremost concern was surveillance of ‘subversives’ and the vague definitions of the term which 
gave ‘continued licence for spying, surveillance and record keeping’.84 Lord Denning’s final report on 
the Profumo Affair described a subversive as someone who ‘would contemplate the overthrow of 
the Government by unlawful means’.85 In 1975, Home Office minister Lord Harris of Greenwich gave 
a new definition, subsequently endorsed by Home Secretary Merlyn Rees, as ‘activities which 
threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and are intended to undermine or overthrow 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’.86 Wide-ranging definitions gave 
a ‘continued licence’ for the security services to watch ‘labour, leftist and trade union activities’, 
which, supported by ‘bugs’ or other eavesdropping devices, intruded into privacy.87
Over the course of its research, the committee gathered examples of ‘political snooping’ from 
unions and pressure groups, with wider consultation showing deep-rooted suspicions amongst 
party members.88 Hemel Hempstead Constituency Labour Party (CLP) reached the resolution that 
it ‘is essential that all internal security systems be capable of scrutiny by a Parliamentary-Sub- 
Committee, and that the appointment of a single member of the judiciary is insufficient for this 
purpose’.89 The Edinburgh CLP was similarly concerned at the powers of the ‘secret state’ which 
posed a ‘barrier to the development of scialism [sic] and a threat to the right and ability to mobilise 
against the capitalist state’, while Harborough CLP wanted Labour to push for the ‘democratic 
control’ of the intelligence agencies, and that legitimate political activities should not ‘be subject 
to telephone tapping and other forms of surveillance or harassment’.90 Individual examples, real or 
imagined, continued the paranoia around surveillance. The secretary of the Newbridge Labour Party, 
and an organiser for Workers Educational Association (WEA), found his course on socialist William 
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Morris had been ‘visited by Special Branch officers’, leading Home Secretary Merlyn Rees to admit to 
local MP Neil Kinnock that the class had been investigated ‘because it might attract extremist 
elements in the same way as a course on . . . the history of the National Socialist movement’. 
Barnstaple Labour Party referred the NEC’s study group to an example ‘where a local Communist 
Party Branch Secretary moved into a village, a neighbour was approached to “keep an eye on his 
activities” and report to the police’. Evidence from the Socialist Education Association found 
members applying for jobs in schools were deemed ‘unsuitable’, suggesting that police reports 
were used for the council’s hiring policy.91 By December 1982, such responses fed into Labour’s calls 
for tighter oversight, with a set of proposals, ‘Freedom and the Security Services’, completed and 
leaked to the Associated Press. Though they needed to be endorsed by the home policy and National 
Executive Committees, the document and its broad conclusions had already received endorsement 
from Shadow Home Secretary Roy Hattersley, who, in December 1982, had already called for 
parliamentary oversight,92 in anticipation of becoming part of Labour’s official policy.
Unknown to Labour, the government had already seen the proposals thanks to ‘unofficial’ 
sources. In May 1982, Armstrong wrote to Thatcher that the final set of proposals were based on 
earlier private members bills, and resulted essentially from ‘misunderstandings about the security 
and intelligence machinery and there are a number of factual inaccuracies’, with publication result-
ing in more unwanted questions on security and intelligence matters, and the response the 
proposals the same as before.93 For the government, the proposals also came at an awkward time. 
In their 1981 report, the Security Commission, chaired by Lord Diplock, had recommended agency 
avowal, suggesting that SIS’s existence was ‘common knowledge’.94 A working party under 
Intelligence Co-ordinator Sir Anthony Duff rejected the proposal, citing fears that avowal would 
only lead to more questions on budgets, control and oversight,95 while Armstrong had advised 
against publishing the Commission’s report, much to Diplock’s annoyance.96 During 
a November 1982 debate on former GCHQ employee Geoffrey Prime, found guilty on seven counts 
for passing information to the Soviets, and a further three for indecently assaulting three young girls, 
Michael Foot pressed for ‘parliamentary control’ over Britain’s agencies, which were ‘one of the few 
aspects of our national life over which there is at present no direct parliamentary control at all’.97
Freedom and the security services
The policy recommendations in Labour’s ‘Freedom and the Security Services’ were finally released in 
March 1983.98 The document was noteworthy, and a first in British political history. Jim Mortimer, the 
Party General Secretary, underlined the significance: ‘it is the first major review of this policy area 
ever undertaken by the Party’.99 Setting out Labour’s policy towards intelligence and security, it 
acknowledged the rising tensions between security and civil liberties. Although recognising that 
much of the criticism of the intelligence services was ‘ill-founded’, Labour had ‘considerable evi-
dence’ that elements of British intelligence had a ‘fundamentally anti-socialist outlook’, failing to 
serve the ‘interests of the nation as a whole’. Nonetheless, despite the criticism, the intelligence 
agencies were needed to face ‘genuine threats’, yet significant reform was needed. In Labour’s view, 
British intelligence had directly intervened in British political life, spreading their views via calculated 
leaks to openly right-wing political groups and research organisations, and portraying those cam-
paigning for social change as the ‘tools of the Soviet Union’. Britain’s spies had been far from neutral, 
targeting anyone in the anti-nuclear movement, while neglecting other issues:
. . . the real threats to the national interests of British working people are very different. In 1976 there was a run on 
the pound, in which the City of London and the banks played a leading part, as a result of which the British 
national interest was directly damaged. We found no evidence whatsoever that the security services were at all 
interested in the activities of those involved in currency speculation. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the Special Branch compiles dossiers, taps phones or puts tails on currency speculators, company directors 
and managers or activists within the Conservative Party, on a scale comparable to its activities against trade 
unionists and socialists – or even at all.100
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. . . This highlights the basic assumptions of those who direct and control the security services, assumptions 
regrettably underwritten even by Labour home secretaries. It is assumed almost without question that the trade 
union and labour movement, which articulates the views and aspirations of the great majority of society, is 
potentially “subversive” and an enemy of “society”. On the other hand the views and aspirations of those who 
control private capital are regarded as the healthy order of things; their political voice, the Tory Party, is regarded 
as the natural protector of “society”.101
The next Labour Government would achieve significant change with the introduction of two acts of 
Parliament: a Security Act, consolidating existing law and placing the intelligence services on 
a statutory footing, and a Privacy Act, allowing access to information as in other countries such as 
the United States. The first also involved the scrapping of the Official Secrets Act and replacing it with 
a ‘law against espionage for foreign powers’,102 greater scrutiny with annual reports to Parliament 
and formal legal powers covering the interception of communications. Labour’s policy on access to 
information was far more radical, pre-empting Freedom of Information legislation, and making all 
government papers available ‘unless placed in an exempted category’. Subject to certain exemp-
tions, the legislation would also ‘enable individuals to discover . . . information held on them’, place 
restrictions on the types of information that could be held, and create a supervisory Data Protection 
Agency. The burden would be put on government agencies to ‘justify withholding information’ while 
opening up Britain’s traditional aversion to openness, in line with the US system which had, the NEC 
noted, revealed a number of embarrassing abuses, including the CIA’s MKUltra mind-control pro-
gramme and overseas covert operations.103 Under the proposals, both the D Notice system and 
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act would be scrapped, and new set of safeguards to protect against 
surveillance.104 Under the proposals, the bugging, tapping and access to personal information would 
be illegal, unless ‘express legal authority for the official interception of communications is given in 
another act of parliament’. Individuals would also have a ‘general right of access’ to personal 
information, even bringing ‘all police and security service records within the scope of the act’. 
MI5’s registry, and the sensitive information it contained, would also be included – a likely concern 
to MI5 with their files of prominent Labour and trade union figures.105
While the proposals were certainly radical, if a little vague on detail, proposals for a ‘Security Act’ 
aimed to give the government a legal mandate to have a ‘security service’, ending Britain’s non- 
avowal of the agencies. Double standards also emerged under the current system. While Blunt had 
received protection from prosecution, a ‘naval lieutenant who sold some secrets to the Russians for 
£3,000 received a 27-year sentence’. Labour also questioned the focus of the agencies, suggesting 
that that espionage, not the growing field of subversion, needed to be the real focus for the security 
services. Surveillance would be subject to ‘vigorous control’ though the proposals, requiring an in- 
depth rationale and evidence collected so far, added a new level of bureaucracy with the Home 
Secretary personally required to rule out other forms of surveillance.
At the heart of Labour’s proposals was day-to-day oversight of the security services. Other than 
publish a full list of cabinet committees and their membership, under the ‘Security Act’ Ministerial 
oversight would be defined as the present system was unacceptable with the ‘need to know’ 
principle preventing Ministers from having ‘all the relevant facts’. The Home Secretary, responsible 
for MI5, was singled out for reform; the Home Office covered ‘immigration, policing, media, women’s 
rights . . . and at the same time exercise full supervision of MI5, Special Branch and the authorisation 
of individual telephone tapping’ – a huge burden for any individual, with the Home Office split and 
legal issues dealt with by a ‘ministry of legal affairs’. There would also be greater parliamentary 
accountability; previously shrouded in secrecy, the security services would be bound to submit an 
annual report to MPs, even including details on the ‘number of surveillance operations’, forming the 
basis of a yearly debate on security matters, where the relevant Minister would be questioned about 
budgets and priorities. Oversight would also be maintained by a new Security Services Select 
Committee, though the day-to-day oversight of the agencies would not fall within its remit. More 
generally, the size of the agencies and their resources, and the intelligence budget would also come 
under parliamentary scrutiny, with ‘stringent auditing control’. In summary, the next Labour 
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government would push through a series of measures to ensure ‘our security services become 
accountable democratic institutions, and that the rights of individual members of the public are 
protected in law’.106
Conclusion: Labour and oversight after 1983
The publication of Labour’s proposals met with criticism from government insiders; the suggestions, 
reported The Times, ignored the long-standing and unannounced ‘controls on the budgets and the 
operations of the secret agencies exercised by the Cabinet Office on behalf of the Prime Minister’.107 
Journalist Peter Hennessy reported that, if Labour had won the election, officials would have briefed 
‘Ministers on what insiders call “reality” as opposed to “gossip”’.108 The response elsewhere was 
muted; Robin Ramsey, founder of the Lobster magazine, savaged them as underwhelming, the main 
lesson being ‘that there is no effective way of supervising spooks – or of making them 
accountable’.109 Labour’s defeat in the 1983 general election – a campaign described as the ‘byword 
for inefficiency and incompetence’110 – finally killed off the proposals for change. Labour went to the 
polls with a thirty-seven page, unashamedly left-wing manifesto, rushed out before it had been 
properly scrutinised, with a swathe of recommendations on a new economic five-year plan, rena-
tionalisation, workforce democracy, withdrawal from the European Community and calls for uni-
lateral nuclear disarmament – a programme famously dubbed the ‘longest suicide note in history’. 
Labour emerged from the election with just 209 seats, and slightly over twenty-seven per cent of the 
popular vote, returning Thatcher and the Conservative Party to government. While certainly a radical 
programme that failed to hit home with the electorate, Labour’s manifesto broke new ground 
adopting proposals for the reform and oversight of security and intelligence. For the first time, 
a political party had put intelligence and security into a manifesto committing a Labour government 
to a ‘new Security Act’, defining the powers and remit of the agencies, while also introducing 
‘parliamentary accountability’.111
Although reform was only prevented by Labour’s defeat, accountability and oversight remained 
on Labour’s agenda thanks to a new wave of security-related scandals, even if the links to security 
were often tenuous. The death of seventy-eight year old anti-nuclear campaigner Hilda Murrell in 
March 1984, a crime bizarrely blamed, with little justification, on MI5 by veteran Labour MP Tam 
Dalyell, led to calls for a Select Committee of Privy Councillors to ‘keep an eye on our intelligence 
services’.112 Even more damaging were claims, now revived by former MI5 officer Peter Wright in 
Spycatcher, that the Security Service had been part of plot against the Wilson government, bugging 
and burgling its way across London at the request of Ministers. Wright’s memoir itself had been 
banned from publication in the UK but published overseas resulting in a series of unsuccessful and 
embarrassing attempts to end its sale, with Labour’s annual conference at Brighton criticising 
government censorship, pointing to claims of ‘illegality and incompetence’ and condemning ‘claims 
that members of the security services were engaged in a plot to bring down the elected Labour 
government’.113 Wright’s claims also led to criticism from those who had previously been silent on 
oversight issues. Home Secretary Merlyn Rees called for an internal inquiry into ‘dirty tricks’, 
recommending a new ‘oversight body to review annually the work of the security service’, with 
Wright’s claims reinforcing the need to ‘bring the actions of the security services within the ambit of 
the law’ – a call echoed by other senior party figures.114 Labour also tried to persuade Callaghan – 
who had earlier told the Treasury and Civil Service Committee he did ‘not know’ who the agencies 
were accountable to – to personally ask Thatcher for an independent inquiry into intelligence and 
a private meeting, something Thatcher, supported by Armstrong, tried to delay.115 Issuing 
a statement to the Press Association, Callaghan himself had called for an ‘independent body to 
review the oversight, structure, targeting and management’ of MI5, with Labour now finding cross 
party support for changes to the law and scrutiny of the agencies.116
The decade also saw the emergence of a new grass-roots drive for intelligence accountability 
under the guise of ‘Labour Crisis’, chaired by Peter Crampton, a one-time researcher for Labour MP 
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Joan Ruddock, and MEP for Humberside (1989–1999), and supported by Robin Ramsey, as press 
officer and researcher. The campaign was sponsored by Lord Jenkins, a former Home Secretary, who, 
following the Spycatcher allegations, wanted to see greater control of intelligence,117 and a swathe of 
MPs, including Benn, Ken Livingstone, Michael Meacher, David Blunkett, Chris Mullin, Clare Short, 
Jeremy Corbyn and others, with Labour’s 1987 manifesto containing commitments for the earlier 
proposed scrapping of section two of the Official Secrets Act and Freedom of Information 
Legislation, with parliamentary ‘scrutiny’ of the intelligence agencies a general goal.118 Outside of 
parliament, the ongoing fallout of former F Branch officer Cathy Massiter’s allegations made in 
1985,119 that MI5 monitored left-wing groups, especially the campaign group National Council for 
Civil Liberties (NCCL), justified by ‘NCCL’s attacks on certain institutions such as the police’, led former 
NCCL officers, Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harmen, to bring a case before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), claiming that MI5 files on them were an invasion of privacy. Harman, the 
NCCL’s legal officer 1978–1982, had been elected Labour MP for Peckham in 1982, while Hewitt, 
a one-time NCCL General Secretary, became press secretary Leader of the Opposition Neil Kinnock, 
both becoming Ministers under Tony Blair. Although Labour has grasped the mood for change, it 
was the ECHR action that prompted change; without a statutory footing, MI5s activities would, the 
government anticipated, be found to be illegal.120
In government, Armstrong had already started to advise Thatcher that oversight was necessary, 
though it was the agencies themselves, and the view that operations would be curtailed without 
a legal framework, that led to a climb-down.121 Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, previously opposed to 
change, was persuaded having met Sir Antony Duff, MI5’s Director-General since March 1985. 
Although anticipating resistance from Armstrong and Thatcher, both accepted the need for new 
legislation; Armstrong, no doubt scarred by his experience in an Australian courtroom trying to 
prevent the publication of Spycatcher, agreed in April, the Prime Minister – who Armstrong though 
would take a year to agree, giving her tentative approval in July, resulting in Hurd introducing a draft 
bill leading to the new Security Service Act of 1989.122 Effectively bringing MI5 in from the cold, the 
legislation itself failed to mollify those pushing for greater parliamentary oversight, appointing 
a Commissioner, chosen by the Prime Minister, to submit annual reports to Downing Street, and 
a Tribunal for ‘investigating complaints’.123 Arguments for accountability had varied. The Massiter 
case and arrest and imprisonment of MI5 officer Michael Bettaney, sentenced to twenty-three years 
for trying to pass information to the KGB in London, led Conservative MPs Sir Edward Gardner and Sir 
Anthony Kershaw to call for an ‘Ombudsman’ or ‘permanent inspectorate’, while there remained 
cross-party support for a committee of senior privy councillors, all rejected given the ‘long-standing 
convention under which the Government does not provide information or answer questions in 
Parliament on matters of security or intelligence’.124 During the second reading of the Security 
Service Bill, and amidst Labour MPs criticism of MI5, Shadow Home Secretary Roy Hattersley noted 
the need for a Security Service free from political controversy, making the case – as Labour had done 
in the past – for a committee to review grievances.125 In essence, Hattersley and others were not 
opposed to MI5’s work but wanted to avoid, as he said in the bill’s third reading, ‘supervision by 
Government nominees’.126
Yet despite avowal of the Security Service, the Labour-left would continue to be suspicious of the 
security-intelligence agencies, while the drive for greater accountability would continue. In 
April 1989, Labour MPs Bob Cryer, Martin Redmond, Terry Fields, Robert Parry, Dave Nellist and Pat 
Wall tabled an early day motion – eventually supported by thirty-three others, including Diane 
Abbot, a newly elected MP, calling for the ‘abolition of conspiratorial groups like MI5 and Special 
Branch which are not accountable to the British people’, following claims of spying on protestors and 
the labour movement.127 When Stella Rimington became MI5’s first female Director-General in 1992, 
she tried ‘one and for all to knock on the head of the Wilson plot allegation’ by inviting the ‘old 
grandees’ of the Labour Party to the Security Service’s Thames House. The attempt unsurprisingly 
failed, she recalled. ‘Though I tried my best to convince them that they were wrong’, she recalled, ‘I 
knew at the end of the exercise that further efforts would be fruitless . . . I am now convinced that 
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those who believe there was a plot and want to believe it, and nothing anyone can say will change 
their minds’.128 Reviewing Stephen Dorril and Robin Ramsay’s Smear: Wilson and the Secret State for 
the New Left Review, Tony Benn echoed his earlier fears that the security services had tried to 
discredit and destroy the Left’, maintaining that the book was a meticulous study of the right- 
wing networks (including the intelligence agencies) that ‘systematically fabricated lies and had them 
disseminated to undermine public confidence in all those whom the establishment regarded as 
hostile to their privileges and power’.129
Although the Security Service Act marked an important moment in MI5’s history, the UK’s foreign 
intelligence agencies still lacked a statutory footing. In December 1991, Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Patrick Wright acknowledged in his diary, following a meeting 
with Cabinet Secretary Robin Butler and the heads of the intelligence agencies, that civil servants 
needed to ‘draw up the terms under which we could move to both avowal and oversight by the time 
of the general election, if only because the Labour Manifesto makes it clear that the Labour Party will 
press for some sort of oversight’, starting a process of agency avowal and oversight.130 As Wright and 
others predicted, Labour’s 1992 manifesto included a promise to put the agencies under the ‘scrutiny 
of a Parliamentary Select Committee’.131 Pressure mounted still further when, in May 1992, Ministers 
were surprised by a report in The Times, emanating from reports in Washington, revealing that SIS 
would be officially acknowledged by a new law intended to ‘make spies more accountable’, signal-
ling a new ‘watchdog body over the service’s activities’, and prompting a quick amendment to the 
forthcoming Queen’s Speech.132 In Cabinet, Major apologised to Ministers for not having told them 
sooner, arguing that avowing SIS and placing it, alongside GCHQ, within a legal framework was, as he 
later told the Commons, part of his wider aim of ‘away the cobwebs of excessive secrecy’ by opening 
up government.133 Even so, during discussions the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence 
Services noted that, while some measure of oversight was needed to secure parliamentary support 
for any proposed legislation covering SIS and GCHQ, the form that such oversight would take was far 
from finalised, with divisions in government. Butler remained opposed to parliamentary oversight, 
instead advising Major in June 1992 that a Commissioner – as set out in the Security Service Act – was 
the only way to meet the demands for oversight while not discussing intelligence and security 
matters in public.134 Nonetheless, the government proceeded with the proposed legislation in 
November 1993, introducing a parliamentary bill on the intelligence services, culminating in the 
1994 ISA and through it the Intelligence and Security Committee, though criticism continued, this 
time over the scope and nature of the committee’s powers. In the Commons, Jack Cunningham, 
Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, aired misgivings over the ISC’s 
status as an independent, not a formal select, committee, answerable to the Prime Minister, leading 
the charge that it was ‘prime ministerial oversight and scrutiny’, even if the new bill was, he told MPs, 
a ‘victory for the arguments that we have advanced over the years’.135 Several others agreed; John 
Gilbert, a future member of the ISC, said the proposals were ‘timid’.136 Yet further attempts to bolster 
the proposed ISC through amendments in the bill’s third reading, proposed by Peter Mandelson, 
David Winnick and Chris Mullin failed, the bill passing its third reading by 216 votes to just 10 against, 
mostly members of the Socialist Campaign Group, including Jeremy Corbyn, with the Intelligence 
Services Act coming into law later that year, the ISC publishing its first annual report in spring 1996 
under the chairmanship of former Conservative Secretary of State for Defense and Northern Ireland, 
Tom King.137 Rather than make a new appointment after the election of New Labour in 1997, King 
remained the ISC’s chair until the end of the 2001 Parliament, reflecting, writes Mark Phythian, the 
desire to ‘reassure the agencies that the 1983 election manifesto was long forgotten’.138
Although, ironically, it was pressure from European law, rather than domestic opposition, that 
ultimately established the first cracks in government reluctance to recognise the need for legislation 
and limited oversight, Labour’s drive for change – however flawed it was – effectively set the tone for 
domestic discussions on oversight and accountability. Even if the party’s calls for change were often 
rooted in the deep-seated mistrust of the ‘secret state’ and stemmed from misapprehensions based 
on personal experience – as the Benn example shows, Labour’s calls to bring the agencies into a legal 
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framework and establish a parliamentary system of oversight had at heart what is now regarded as 
a liberal democratic norm in the context of intelligence oversight. Studying the development of 
party attitudes towards oversight shows how the engrained suspicion of Britain’s intelligence and 
security agencies, particularly MI5 and Special Branch, fuelled internal Labour discussions, resulting 
in the publication of Labour’s ‘Freedom and the Security Services’. As such, Labour’s wider fears – 
going back even beyond the Zinoviev Affair of the 1920s – broke the bipartisan consensus on 
security matters, for the first-time seeing a British political party come up with policy recommenda-
tions to bring Britain’s agencies ‘in from the cold’. Although the proposals, forming part of the now 
infamous ‘longest suicide note in history’, were prompted by domestic and international concerns 
that intelligence agencies were undemocratic and lacked effective control, and essentially a product 
of battles within Labour, they marked an important moment in the drive for agency accountability 
and reform. In retrospect, Labour’s pitch could be said to be naïve: the scrapping of the Official 
Secrets Act, the reform of the D-Notice System and the opening of MI5’s archives to scrutiny, marked 
Labour’s inexperience on such issues and would have proven to be difficult to implement. But, in 
other areas, the policy proposals were strong, in the end, including suggestions that would become 
a feature of the Security Service Act and Intelligence Services Act. Agency avowal and greater 
openness about the mandates, powers and goals of the security services became normalised as 
Britain’s agencies adjusted to the ‘openness’ of the 1990s. The 1994 Intelligence Services Act – 
despite Labour’s last-minute efforts to secure greater powers for the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, included some, albeit limited, mechanisms for parliamentary oversight, establishing 
the ISC with the work of committee expanding over time – even if problems remain today.139 It is 
broadly correct to observe, as Jack Cunningham did during debates over the future Intelligence 
Services Act, that the passage of legislation was a ‘victory for the arguments that we have advanced 
over the years’.140 Although Labour’s 1983 manifesto will be remembered as an unmitigated disaster, 
proposals on parliamentary oversight of Britain’s intelligence agencies were certainly innovative in 
the context of the time, beginning a period of the party’s commitment to securing oversight that has 
been overlooked. It also shows how the consensus around intelligence and security being off limits 
to party-political discourse ended, with intelligence becoming the subject of party politics.
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